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SIMILARITIES IN AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
In order to carry out numerous and often complicated commercial trans-
actions, merchants throughout the world have sought simplified payment and
credit devices. Such businessmen refrain from using "currency" as a means of
payment because it is bulky and there is the risk of theft or loss in transporta-
tion. Negotiable instruments such as promissory notes, checks and drafts serve
as convenient and safe substitutes for currency, and are used to facilitate the
transfer of funds in international commercial transactions.1
Although each country has its own negotiable instruments law, these
existing laws fall into two main groups: American law, as an outgrowth of the
English common law, constitutes one of those groups; the other group comprises
the law of those countries (mostly European) which have adopted the Geneva
Convention Uniform Law for Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes of 1930.2
In some aspects of negotiable instruments law, the two groups are substantially
similar; in other areas they differ. For example, both of these groups require an
indorsement for the transfer of a negotiable instrument made payable or
indorsed "to the order of X."3 On the other hand, only American rules 4 require
delivery of a negotiable instrument to evidence its existence as a binding
contract.5
The universal commercial need for negotiable instruments, coupled with
differences in laws throughout the world, has prompted the quest for an
"international uniform negotiable instruments law."0 This Comment will
attempt to demonstrate that the American and the Geneva Uniform Law are now
basically similar, because of the universal function of negotiable instruments.
1. See generally Britton, Bills and Notes, Introduction at 1-17 (2d ed. 1961) ; see also
Whitney, Outline of Bills and Notes 1-3 (1948).
2. Reg. No. 3313 (Jan. 1, 1934), League of Nations Pub. Ser. 1930 II. 19 (Official No.
C. 346. M. 142 [CJ.L.C. 54 (1)]) [hereinafter cited Geneva Uniform Law]. The text of the
law is reprinted in 143 League of Nations Treaty Series 274-305, with an annex of reserva-
tions and a protocol; id. at 306-15.
The countries acceding to the Geneva Uniform Law were: Austria, Belgium, Brazil,
Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy,
Japan, Luxemburg, Norway, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland (for Free City of Danzig),
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. See 143 League of Nations
Treaty Series [hereinafter cited L.N.TS.] 257-73 (1933-34).
3. See Commercial Bank v. Barry, 179 La. 684, 154 So. 736 (1934); Citizens Bank v.
Chase, 151 Va. 65, 144 S.E. 464 (1928); see generally Britton, op. cit. supra note 1, at 117.
See also Geneva Uniform Law Art. 11, 143 L.N.T.S. 277.
4. The term "American rules" is meant to encompass both those states which have
adopted the Uniform Commercial Code and those that have retained the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law.
5. See Britton, op. cit. supra note 1, at 119.
6. For a discussion of international unification of negotiable instruments laws, see
Yntema, Unification of the Laws Respecting Negotiable Instruments, 4 Int'l L.Q. 178 (1951).
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In the areas of similarity, American courts and legislatures tend to be inflexible
in their interpretation and formulation of these requirements for negotiability,
which has the effect of maintaining uniformity. The areas where differences
persist are areas where American courts and legislatures tend to be flexible in
their interpretation and formulation, which has the effect of achieving
uniformity.
This exposition is intended to assist the American practitioner in an
American court confronted with a situation in which an American requirement
differs from the foreign requirement. He may argue that the judicial policy of
the American courts should be directed toward facilitating a "uniform negotiable
instruments law" on an international scale. Following this theory, an American
practitioner confronted with a problem involving a promissory note absent the
required words "to order" or "to bearer" but containing the statement "this
note is negotiable" may attempt to persuade the court that the instrument is
nonetheless negotiable.7
IT. REQUISITES OT NEGOTIABILITY
The American Uniform Commercial Code and the Geneva Uniform Law
both require than an instrument, to be negotiable must (1) be in writing and
signed by the maker or drawer; (2) contain an unconditional promise or order
to pay; (3) be payable in a sum certain in money; and (4) be payable on
demand or at a definite time.8 American law, unlike the Geneva Uniform Law,
requires in addition that the instrument be payable "to order" or "to bearer." 9
As will be shown, when American courts and legislatures are confronted with a
problem involving one of the first four requisites, they tend to be inflexible
in their interpretation and formulation of these requisites, but when confronted
with the fifth requisite, which is not imposed throughout the world, the American
judicial and legislative attitude is flexible.
A. Writing and Signature
Both the American law and Geneva Uniform Law require that the instru-
ment to be negotiable must be in writing and signed by the maker or drawer.' 0
The American courts appear to interpret this requirement strictly. Although
they have broadened the meaning of the terms "writing" and "signature,""
they have not permitted any substitutes. A "writing" includes printing, typewrit-
ing or any other intentional reduction of the terms of the promise to tangible
7. See Gray v. Gardner, 12 Pa. D. & C. 449 (1929); Essig v. Porter, 63 Ind. App.
318, 112 N.E. 1005 (1916). (A statement to the effect that "this note is negotiable" held to
be a substitute for "words of negotiability.")
8. See Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter cited U.C.C.] § 3-104(1); for the
Geneva requirements see Geneva Uniform Law Art. 1, 143 L.N.T.S. 275.
9. U.C.C. § 3-104(1)(d).
10. U.C.C. § 3-104(1)(a); see Geneva Uniform Law Art. 1, 143 L.N.T.S. 275, for
Geneva requirement.
11. See generally Hawkland, Cases on Bills and Notes 12-13 (1956).
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form.' 2 American courts, however, will not permit an oral promise to qualify
as a negotiable instrument.' 3 Similarly, if the maker or drawer does not sign,
the instrument is not negotiable.14
B. Unconditional Promise or Order to Pay
A second American requirement, with an identical counterpart under the
Geneva Uniform Law, is that of an unconditional promise.'5 American courts
have interpreted this requisite narrowly. For example, "[T]here is a consider-
able body of authority to the effect that if the instrument contains the phrase
'subject to' the terms of another document, or words to that effect, the refer-
ence is fatal to negotiability regardless of the actual provisions of the other
document."' 6 American courts will not examine the other document to deter-
mine whether the instrument is made conditional. If the instrument contains
the "subject to" language, they will not admit extrinsic evidence which could
possibly explain away the condition. As further evidence of inflexibility, the Uni-
form Commercial Code, which is considered a composite of judicial decisions,' 7
indicates the extensive number of circumstances where the courts have held the
instrument is not made conditional.' 8 An unconditional promise or order is not
made conditional by the fact that the instrument states its consideration,' 0
refers to or states that it arises out of a separate agreement,20 or is limited to
payment out of the entire assets of a partnership. 2 '
C. Sum Certain in Money
Section 3-104(c) of the Uniform Commercial Code and Article I of the
Geneva Uniform Law22 both state that an instrument must be payable in a
sum certain in money. Although American courts have extended the meaning
of "money" beyond mere domestic legal tender, 23 they do not permit substitutes.
12. See U.C.C. § 1-201(46).
13. See 1 Hawkland, A Transactional Guide to the Uniform Commercial Code § 2.0303
(1964).
14. See U.C.C. § 3-104(1) (a).
15. U.C.C. § 3-104(1)(b); see Geneva Uniform Law Art. 1, 143 L.N.T.S. 275, for
Geneva requirement.
16. United States v. Farrington, 172 F. Supp. 797, 800 (D.C. Mass. 1959); accord,
Enoch v. Brandon, 249 N.Y. 263, 164 N.E. 45 (1928); Verner v. White, 214 Ala. 550, 108
So. 369 (1926); Hull v. Angus, 60 Or. 95, 118 Pac. 284 (1911).
17. See Beutel, The Proposed Uniform Commercial Code as a Problem in Codification,
16 Law & Contemp. Prob. 141, 158 (1951). "[T]he Commercial Code is not a code at all in
the sense in which the term is commonly used to indicate the reductions of general concepts
of law to written statutes. The style of the various sections is more like the Restatement
which was designed as a detailed statement of holdings of cases rather than a scientific
exposition of legal principles."
18. U.C.C. § 3-105(1).
19. U.C.C. § 3-105(1)(b).
20. U.C.C. § 3-105(l) (c).
21. U.C.C. § 3-105(1)(h).
22. See Geneva Uniform Law Art. 1, 143 L.N.T.S. 275.
23. See Brown v. Perera, 176 N.Y. Supp. 215 (1918) (A bill or note payable in a
specific foreign money is negotiable.); Incitti v. Ferrante, 12 N.J. Misc. 840, 175 AtI, 908
(1933) (Instrument payable in money of any country in its coins or in known currency of a
country is negotiable.); Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. Santa Maria Sugar Co., 162 App. Div. 248,
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An American negotiable instrument cannot be made payable in "lumber," for
example. 24 The sum payable is a "sum certain" even though it is to be paid with
stated interest or by stated installments, 25 different rates of interest,26 with
cost of collection or attorneys' fees,27 or with exchange at a fixed or current rate.28
While sustaining the negotiability of instruments containing promises to pay in
the above circumstances, the American courts have been consistent in their
interpretation of "sum certain" by holding that these promises were promises
to pay a sum certain at maturity.29 The various illustrations mentioned above
refer only to promises to do something after the note matured.
D. Certainty of Maturity
Certainty of maturity is a world-wide requisite of negotiability. Under
American law, a negotiable instrument must be payable on demand or at a
definite future date. ° Similarly, Article I of the Geneva Uniform Law provides:
"A negotiable instrument contains . . . the date of maturity."31 Although
acceleration and extension clauses seem to disrupt this certainty requirement,
the American courts have approved such clauses by consistently finding a fixed
"outside date of maturity."32 A consent to extend authorizes a single extension
for not longer than the original period;38 thus if an extension is granted, the
"outside date of maturity" will still be easily ascertainable.3 4
E. Words of Negotiability
There is one American requisite of negotiability which does not appear
to have a counterpart under the Geneva Uniform Law. American law requires
147 N.Y. Supp. 498 (1st Dep't 1914). But see Thompson v. Sloan, 23 Wend. 71, 35 Am.
Dec. 546 (N.Y. 1840) ("Canada money"). See also U.C.C. § 3-107. See generally, Britton,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 119-25 (1943).
24. Gregory v. Morrow, 4 Wash. 2d 144, 102 P.2d 699 (1940). See also Auerbach v.
Pritchett, 58 Ala. 451 (1877) (Instrument cannot be made payable in cotton.); Hodges v.
Clinton, 1 N.C. 79, 1 Mart. 76 (1792) (instrument non-negotiable which contained a
promise "to pay 1100 currency, payable in tobacco").
25. U.C.C. § 3-106(1) (a).
26. U.C.C. § 3-106(1)(b).
27. U.C.C. § 3-106(1) (e). See Dorsey v. Wolff, 142 Il. 589, 32 N.. 495 (1892).
28. U.C.C. § 3-106(1) (d). See Smith v. Kendall, 9 Mich. 241, 80 Am. Dec. 83 (1861)
(Instrument containing a promise to pay "with current exchange on New York," held
negotiable.).
29. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Wolff, 142 1l1. 589, 32 N.E. 495 (1892).
"The promise to pay the attorney's fee is a promise to do something after the note
matures. It does not affect the character of the note before, or up to the time of
its maturity....
The . . . promise as to attorney's fee cannot, therefore, affect the negotiability of
the note, because the negotiability of a promissory note is, for all practical pur-
poses, at an end when it matures." Id. at 594, 32 N.E. at 496.
30. U.C.C. § 3-104(1) (c).
31. Kelso, International Law of Commerce 279 (1961). For a more generalized state-
ment ("time of payment") see, Geneva Uniform Law Art. 1, 143 L.N.T.S. 275.
32. See Official Comment 5 to U.C.C. § 3-109.
33. U.C.C. § 3-118(f).
34. See United States v. General Resources Ltd., 204 F. Supp. 872 (D. Colo. 1962)
(Where extension of note is for a definite period (six months) it does not destroy ne-
gotiability.).
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that an instrument be payable "to order" or "to bearer," or contain words of
negotiability.3 5 There is some question as to whether the Geneva requirement
of designating the type of instrument3 6 (e.g., promisory note, bill of exchange)
is equivalent to the order-bearer requisite. American courts and legislatures tend
to be liberal in their interpretation and formulation of the order-bearer require-
ment. Regardless of whether the Geneva requirement is presently considered
to be the counterpart of the American order-bearer requisite, the American courts
and legislatures are slowly approaching the same result.
Uniform Commercial Code section 3-104(1) (d) states that any writing
to be negotiable must contain words of "order" or "bearer." Looking beyond
the statutory phrase, a number of substitutes are permitted: "[This] is not
intended to mean that the instrument must follow the language of this sec-
tion, or that one term may not be recognized as clearly the equivalent of an-
other ... "37 An instrument made payable to the "assigns" of any person is
equivalent to order paper.38 "Payable to the order of" is equivalent to "pay to
X or order."
3 9
An instrument which recites, "This note shall be negotiable," and does not
otherwise contain words of negotiability has been held negotiable by many
American courts.40 If an instrument does not itself contain words of negotiability,
it can be made negotiable by contract. The contract is part of the instrument,
and if the contract so states, the instrument is negotiable. It should be noted that
negotiability by contract acts as a substitute for words of negotiability, but
generally not for other requisites. 41
Section 3-805 of the Uniform Commercial Code affirms the theory that
words of negotiablility are dispensable to some extent: "This Article applies to
any instrument whose terms do not preclude transfer and which is otherwise
negotiable within this Article but which is not payable to order or to bearer,
except that there can be no holder in due course of such an instrument.142 An
instrument, therefore, absent the order-bearer requirement, nonetheless could be
treated to some extent as a negotiable instrument by the terms of this section.
The first four requisites of negotiability involve the substantive issue of a
need for commercial certainty, speed, and facility of transfer. If an instrument
is not in writing, not signed by the maker or drawer, not unconditionally pay-
able, not payable in a sum certain in money, or not payable on demand or at a
35. U.C.C. § 3-104(1) (d).
36. Geneva Uniform Law Art. 1, 143 L.N.T.S. 275. See Kelso, op. cit. supra note 31.
37. Official Comment 5 to U.C.C. § 3-104.
38. U.C.C. § 3-110(1).
39. U.C.C. § 3-110(1).
40. Gray v. Gardner, 12 Pa. D. & C. 449 (1929); Essig v. Porter, 63 Ind. App. 318,
112 N.E. 1005 (1916); see Spillers v. Lafever, 39 Ala. App. 465, 103 So. 2d 837 (1958).
41. Compare, e.g., Moore v. Vaughn, 167 Miss. 758, 150 So. 372 (1933) (The court
held that a recital that the instrument is negotiable cannot make a note negotiable where
the payee's name is missing), with Enoch v. Brandon, 249 N.Y. 263, 164 N.E. 45 (1928).
42. U.C.C. § 3-805.
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definite time, the instrument is non-negotiable. The payee could not be certain
of whether, when or from whom he could receive satisfaction. On the other
hand, if all four commercial requisites were satisfied, absence of order-bearer
language would not be fatal. The order-bearer requisite signifies a mere matter
of form, capable of being replaced by other forms. Just as the ancient requirement
of a seal on an instrument can now be satisfied with evidence of legal effect or
consideration, a substitute for order-bearer language can be supplied by evidence
that the instrument is otherwise negotiable.
III. NEGOTIATION OF INSTRUMENTS
Both the United States and the European countries employing the Geneva
Uniform Law require the payee and special indorsee to indorse the instrument
in order to negotiate it.43 If a negotiable instrument is executed "Pay to the
order of X" or an indorsement is made "to the order of X," the payee or
indorsee must indorse in order to negotiate the instrument to a subsequent
holder. 44 American courts tend to be inflexible in their interpretation and
application of this universal requirement.
Under rules of American law, in addition to indorsement, delivery of the
negotiable instrument is essential to evidence its existence as a binding contract.45
Section 16 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law states: "Every contract
on a negotiable instrument is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the
instrument for the purpose of giving effect thereto." Delivery of the instrument
by the maker, drawer or indorser is a condition precedent to his liability on the
instrument. 46 Under the Geneva Uniform Law, the mere existence of an instru-
ment which satisfies all other requisites causes it to have the effect of a negotiable
instrument.47 Consequently, European courts applying this rule refuse to
question the manner whereby the instrument came into circulation. 48 To illus-
trate, if a European payee has in his hands an instrument which qualifies as
negotiable under Article I of the Geneva Uniform Law, the European courts will
not inquire as to whether that instrument had been delivered to the payee by
the maker.
The above difference is minimized in practice by the liberality of the Amer-
ican courts in their interpretation of the delivery requirement. The courts
presume that there has been delivery of a negotiable instrument when such
instrument is in the possession of and produced by a person other -than the
maker. 40 Furthermore, a lack of delivery is only a personal defense, not available
43. See authorities cited note 2 supra.
44. Ibid.
45. See Britton, Bills and Notes 119 (2d ed. 1961).
46. This is a codification of the common law rule; id. at 119-22.
47. See Kelso, op. cit. supra note 31, at 279-80.
48. Id. at 280.
49. Irving Trust Co. v. Leff, 253 N.Y. 359, 171 N.E. 569 (1930); Rhinock v. Simms,
226 App. Div. 313, 235 N.Y. Supp. 143 (Ist Dep't 1929), aff'd, 253 N.Y. 602, 171 N.E. 800
(1930).
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against a holder in due course. 0 In Schaeffer v. Marsh,r1 an action was brought
by a holder for value without notice (i.e., a holder in due course) of a certain
check drawn by the defendant to the order of one Marsh, another defendant,
indorsed by Marsh and negotiated to the plaintiff holder. It appeared that after
drawing and signing the check, but before delivery, it was stolen and thereafter
indorsed and negotiated by the payee, Marsh. The court virtually disregarded
the delivery requirement and held that the fact the instrument never had a
valid inception is no defense to an action by a holder in due course.Y2
IV. REQUISITES FOR A HOLDER IN DUE COURSE
In order to become a holder in due course under American law, a holder
must take a negotiable instrument in good faith, for value, and prior to matu-
rity.58 Under the Geneva Uniform Law, a European holder need not take an
instrument for value in order to qualify as a holder in due course,54 but the
Geneva rules do require a taking in good faith and prior to maturity. As Dean
Hawkland has commented, "All civilized systems of law require a good faith
taking before one may qualify as a holder in due course."u55 Since the universal
requirement of taking in good faith and prior to maturity is a fundamental
aspect of negotiable instrument doctrine, American courts and legislatures are
strict in their interpretation and formulation of these requirements.
A. Good Faith
Chief judge Moschzisker of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has discussed
the omnipresence of the good faith requirement, as follows:
running through all the authorities dealing with holders in due course
we find the principle, not always stated, perhaps, that he who seeks the
protection given one in that position must have dealt fairly and honestly
in acquiring the instrument in controversy and in regard to the rights
of all prior parties, this is, the kind of good faith which the law
demands, and the principle is closely analogous to the equitable
doctrine of clean hands.5 6
Every person seeking relief in a court of equity must come into court with
clean hands; every taker of a negotiable instrument must take the instrument
in good faith or be subject to personal defenses.57 American courts and legis-
latures have developed a number of tests relating to good faith. The majority
of thesi courts and legislatures (by way of the Uniform Commercial Code)
50. See U.C:C. §§ 3-305, 3-306.
51. 90 Misc. 307, 153 N.Y. Supp. 96 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
52. Id. at 308, 153 N.Y. Supp. at 97; see also Poess v. Twelfth Ward Bank, 43 Misc.
45, 86 N.Y. Supp. 857 (Sup. Ct. 1904); Greeser v. Sugarman, 37 Misc. 799, 76 N.Y. Supp.
922 (Sup. Ct. 1902).
53. See U.C.C. § 3-302(1); see Hawkland, Commercial Paper 79 (1959).
54. See Geneva Uniform Law Arts. 16, 17, 143 L.N.T.S. 279-80.
55. Hawkland, op. cit. supra note 53, at 80-81.
56. Fehr v. Campbell, 288 Pa. 549, 588, 137 AUt. 113, 116 (1927).
57. See Goodman v. Simonds, 61 US. (20 How.) 343, 366 (1857).
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have adopted the subjective "white heart" test.58 Under this test, good faith
is determined by looking to the mind of the particular holder who is claiming
to be a holder in due course. 9 Some American courts have adopted a "redlights"
theory.60 According to this theory, actual knowledge of a suspicious circum-
stance obliges the holder to make further inquiries at the risk of losing his
status as a holder in due course. The Uniform Commercial Code, as a composite
of judicial decisions, has compiled a list of suspicious circumstances which should
alert persons seeking to qualify as holders in due course. "A holder does not be-
come a holder in due course of an instrument: (a) by purchase of it at a judicial
sale or by taking it under legal process; (b) by acquiring it in taking over an
estate; or (c) by purchasing it as part of a bulk transaction not in regular
course of business of the transferor."161 A third test is often referred to as a
test of "commercial reasonableness." 62 Under this test the courts determine
whether some fact or facts exist with respect to a transaction which would
discourage a commercially honest man from entering into the transaction.
As further evidence of inflexibility with respect to the good faith require-
ment, American courts have frequently disqualified holders who have taken in
good faith on the basis of a very close association of holder and payee. Thus,
finance companies have been held not to be holders in due course because they
were too closely associated with a transferor-payee in financing the sale out
of which the promissory note arose.
63
American courts have held that a single suspicious circumstance does not
disqualify a holder on the grounds of lack of good faith; instead they consider
the entire situation or combination of circumstances. In Wilson v. Mid-West
State Bank,64 a purchaser of a check claimed he had taken in good faith. The
evidence demonstrated that the purchaser frequently participated in a game
of "craps," and had paid for and received the check in the seclusion of a
water-closet from a friend who was not financially responsible. Taken individu-
ally, each circumstance alone does show bad faith, but in combination, there
is a strong case for absence of good faith.
58. See generally 1 Hawkland, A Transactional Guide to the Uniform Commercial
Code 540 (1964).
59. See Hawkland, op. cit. supra note 53, at 84-85. See, e.g., Driscoll v. Burlington-
Bristol Bridge Co., 8 N.J. 433, 86 A.2d 201 (1952); First Nat'l Bank v. Goldberg, 340 Pa.
337, 17 A.2d 377 (1941); Rice v. Barrington, 75 N.JJ.. 806, 70 Ad. 169 (1908).
60. See Thomes v. Atkins, 52 F. Supp. 405 (D.C. Minn. 1943); Rochester Turnpike
Road Co. v. Paviour, 164 N.Y. 281, 58 N.E. 114 (1900).
61. U.C.C. § 3-302(3).
62. See Gerseta Corp. v. Wessex-Campbell Silk Co., 3 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1924). See
also the 1950 edition of Uniform Commercial Code § 3-302(1) (b) which read: "'(b) in good
faith including observance of the reasonable commercial standards of any business in which
the holder engaged .... "
63. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange Co. Machine Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214
P.2d 819 (1950); Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940);
Buffalo Industrial Bank v. De Marzio, 162 Misc. 742, 296 N.Y. Supp. 783 (Buffalo City
Ct. 1937).
64. 193 Iowa 311, 186 N.W. 891 (1922).
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B. Taking Prior to Maturity
At common law, the purchase of an instrument after maturity automatically
subjected the purchaser to personal and real defenses;ot this rule was merely
an incident to the rule requiring a purchase in good faith. Chief Justice Shaw
aptly set forth the relationship between taking prior to maturity and requirement
of good faith:
where a negotiable note is found in circulation after it is due, it
carries suspicion on the face of it. The question instantly arises, Why
is it in circulation,--why is it not paid? here is something wrong.
Therefore, although it does not give the indorser [sic; indorsee]
notice of any specific matter of defense such as set-off, payment, or
fraudulent acquisition, yet it puts him on inquiry; he takes only such
title as the indorser himself has, and subject to any defense which
would be made, if the suit were brought by the indorser.60
As noted above, this requirement of taking in good faith, once embracing a
purchase before maturity, has been strictly enforced. The emergence of a
"before maturity requirement" as a distinct requisite under the American nego-
tiable instruments law67 emphasizes the strict attitude of the American courts
and legislatures in making certain that this requirement is satisfied.
C. Taking for Value
There is a difference between American and Geneva Uniform Law in the
case of "taking for value," and American courts and the Uniform Commercial
Code seem to be flexible in their interpretation and formulation of the require-
ment. The courts and the code permit substitutes for a transfer of money as
value given for an instrument. An antecedent or pre-existing debt constitutes
value.68 A holder takes an instrument for value to the extent that he acquires
a security interest in or a lien on the instrument other than by legal process0
When a holder gives a negotiable instrument for another instrument, or makes
an irrevocable commitment of funds to a third person, he has given value.70
The so-called American "first-in, first-out" rule for bank withdrawals
illustrates the flexibility of American courts in interpreting the requirement
of "taking for value." Although it is clear that banks may qualify as holders
in due course, a question often arises as to when a bank is deemed to be a
holder or taker "for value." When a bank takes a negotiable instrument as
security for a loan, the funds representing the loan are set up in a commercial
account. As indicated by the Uniform Commercial Code71 and a number of
65. See Britton, op. cit. supra note 45, at 301.
66. Fisher v. Leland, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 456, 458-59, 50 Am. Dec. 805, 806 (1849).
67. See U.C.C. § 3-302(1) (c).
68. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842); U.C.C. § 3-303(b).
69. U.C.C. § 3-303(a).
70. U.C.C. § 3-303(c).
71. See U.C.C. § 3-303(a) in light of U.C.C. § 4-208.
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cases since Fox v. Bank of Kansas City,72 the earliest withdrawals are considered
payment or value for the oldest credits.73 Thus, if several loans have been made,
the bank can easily become a holder for value as to the instrument representing
the first loan as soon as funds are withdrawn from the account. Under a strict
view (or "last-in, first-out"), the bank would have a difficult time qualifying
as a holder for value (and ultimately, a holder in due course) on the first of
many loans made within a short period of time.
V. REQUMEMMNT OF CONSIDERATION
American contract law requires proof of consideration 74 passing to a promi-
sor in order to enforce the promise or agreement in a court of law. A negotiable
instrument is an agreement by the maker or drawer promising to pay a sum
certain in money. Thus in the United States the negotiable instrument, like any
other promise, has to be supported by consideration passing from the payee to
the maker or drawer. Although European or civil law countries have not de-
veloped the doctrine of consideration,7 5 they do have a similar means of show-
ing that a contract between maker and payee has or was intended to have legal
effect or importance. Civil law countries refer to this legal effect as "cause." 76
The term 77 has been referred to as meaning either the motive underlying the
making of the contract, or the purpose for which it is made.78 One commentator
has remarked that the "cause" of any contract is merely the promise by the
other.79 Hence, it appears that both the American and European legal systems
are merely providing a test by which the courts decide whether the parties
intended a legal effect to be given to their promise or agreement, whether it is
referred to as "consideration" or "cause."
If "intended legal effect" is a universal requirement, it follows that Ameri-
can courts and legislatures will be somewhat inflexible in interpreting and for-
mulating a requirement of original consideration in negotiable instruments law.
Although consideration is a necessary element of American negotiable instru-
ments, this requirement seems to be largely a formality. American courts rarely
make an extensive search for original consideration in an action based on a
negotiable instrument, unless the lack of it is specifically brought to the atten-
72. 30 Kan. 441, 1 Pac. 789 (1883).
73. First Nat'l Bank v. Court, 183 Wis. 203, 197 N.W. 798 (1924); Merchants Nat'l
Bank v. Santa Maria Sugar Co., 162 App. Div. 248, 147 N.Y. Supp. 498 (1st Dep't 1914).
74. See Restatement, Contracts § 75 (1932):
(1) Consideration for a promise is
(a) an act other than a promise, or
(b) a forbearance, or
(c) the creation, modification or destruction of a legal relation, or
(d) a return promise,
bargained for and given in exchange for the promise.
75. See von Mehren, Civil-Law Analogues to Consideration: An Exercise in Com-
parative Analysis, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1009 (1959); Wright, Ought the Doctrine of Considera-
tion To Be Abolished From the Common Law? 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1225 (1936).
76. See French Civil Code Art. 1131, for a statutory example.
77. Originally and in some countries still referred to by the Roman "causa."
78. See Wright, supra note 75, at 1234.
79. See Hall, Cause or Consideration, 23 Can. Bar. Rev. 831 (1945).
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tion of the court as a defense.80 The plaintiff (holder or payee) does not have
the burden of demonstrating that there is consideration for the negotiable in-
strument which he is attempting to enforce; there is a presumption in his favor
that there is consideration.8 ' Furthermore, if a defense of want or failure of
consideration is pleaded by a maker or drawer, the defense may be of minimal
value, since it is utiavailable if the instrument has been negotiated to a holder
in due course.8 2 As additional evidence of the retreat from the strict require-
ment of original consideration, there are three instances where the Uniform
Commercial Code does not allow the defense of "no consideration:" (1) the
acceptor or drawee promises to pay an instrument but receives no consideration
for the promise; (2) the accommodation maker guarantees payment without
receiving consideration; (3) a negotiable instrument is given as a charita-
ble subscription with nothing given in return.88 In these three situations, Ameri-
can legislatures have adopted a liberal approach by excusing the requirement
of consideration. Although the requirement of intended legal effect is charac-
teristic of both American and civil law jurisdictions, the foregoing examples
have demonstrated American leniency toward the doctrine of consideration.
The reason for American flexibility with respect to this requirement may
be traced to a universal need for dispensing with proof of consideration in
commercial transactions. Commercial life is characterized by frequent and rapid
transactions and the requirement of looking into consideration to any signifi-
cant extent seems to destroy the continuity of business activity. Consequently,
some commentators have suggested revision of the law of consideration with the
possibility of entirely eliminating the requirement in a commercial context.8 4
American courts and legislatures have minimized the requirement of considera-
tion in negotiable instruments law, for example, by presuming it to be present
and by allowing a defense of lack or failure of consideration to operate only
against those who do not qualify as holders in due course.88
Furthermore, American flexibility may be compared to European laxity
with respect to "cause." There is not only a presumption in civil law jurisdic-
tions that "cause" exists in the case of negotiable instruments, but it is not an
essential element of their validity. "[Negotiable instruments] serve a primary
purpose of circulating in commerce as evidence of credit or indebtedness, and
the law will not permit the reason or 'causa' for their existence to detract from
their primary purpose."80
80. See Official Comment 2 to U.C.C. § 3-307 (defendant has the burden of estab-
lishing all defenses).
81. See, e.g., First Natl Bank v. Stallo, 160 App. Div. 702, 145 N.Y. Supp. 747 (1st
Dep't 1914).
82. U.C.C. § 3-408.
83. See Note, Consideration in Negotiable Instruments: The Commercial Code Article
III, Section 501, 57 Yale L.J. 1408 (1948).
84. See Wright, supra note 75, at 1252.
85. See supra notes 75, 76.




In many aspects of negotiable instruments law, the American and Geneva
Uniform Law are similar, if not identical. It is apparent that American courts
and legislatures, in order to serve the same ends as those of the Geneva Uni-
form Law, have been strict in their interpretation of the requirements of nego-
tiability. In those instances where the American negotiable instruments law
and the Geneva Uniform Laws are different, the American courts and legisla-
tures, as demonstrated, have reduced these differences to virtual uniformity
by their more liberal approach. Whether this legislative and judicial tendency
is deliberate or inadvertent is not a vital question. However, to recognize that
this tendency exists may have great practical significance. Perhaps this Ameri-
can legislative and judicial tendency will develop into pronounced policy with
the efforts of astute commercial law advocates.
MAusm.LL L. COHEN
THE PATERNITY SUIT IN EUROPE
The purpose of this Comment is to present a survey of European laws
dealing with suits (a) to establish paternity and (b) to deny paternity. While
the language used in both of these proceedings is similar, their basic nature
differs greatly. The former, instituted by an illegitimate (natural) child or,
more frequently, by an unmarried female on behalf of her child, has the ultimate
aim of establishing the identity of the father of the child. The benefits sought
to be derived from a successful suit range from support for the child to full
"status rights."1 The suit to deny paternity, however, is brought by a married
male against a child of his wife, seeking to overcome the presumption of
paternity and to have his presumptive relationship with the child declared
nonexistent.
Because of the relatively greater incidence and importance of the suit to'
establish paternity, more attention will be given it. Such topics as the limitations
on the rights to institute paternity proceedings, defenses available to the alleged
father, statutes of limitations and the different treatment given to children of
unwed mothers and the offspring of incestuous or adulterous relationships will
be considered.
This survey is divided into three parts. The first is a discussion of the
French law followed by a discussion of the various European nations which, to
some extent, follow the French system. A brief history of the French develop-
ment is presented to reveal the framework upon which is built the present law
1. "Status rights" are all the rights normally attained by a legitimate child from the
relationship of such child with its father. Among the "status rights" are inheritance, support
and the name and citizenship of the father. The term is commonly used in all European
nations.
